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This article reviews the past, present and future challenges facing the Committee of the
Regions, 10 years after its creation. It looks first at the way in which politics inside the
Committee have developed, in particular how internal divisions have been managed,
prior to examining the relations between the Committee, the EU institutions and other
actors on the national level. Based on these observations, the article then briefly assesses
the effectiveness of the Committee’s work, taking not only account of the opinions it has
delivered, but also the wider impact its activity has had on the role of regions in the
European Union. By way of conclusion the article then identifies some long-term trends in
the institutional life of the Committee of the Regions, and against this background looks
ahead towards the challenges the Committee faces after the enlargement of the European
Union and the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty.
1. Introduction
The creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in
1994, following the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty, was a milestone for the representation of local and
regional interests in the European Union (EU). On the one
hand, almost a decade after the agreement on the Single
European Act (SEA), it constituted the culmination of efforts
by regional and local actors to be taken more seriously in
the EU policy process. It was the SEA, with its economic and
regulatory impact on regional and local authorities, that
demonstrated the extent to which Europe mattered to
subnational levels of government. On the other hand, it
was a high-point in this long-standing quest by regions for
direct access to the summit of EU decision-making. There
were some expectations that this achievement would soon
be followed by even bolder steps towards an institutio-
nalisation of the ‘third level’, with the more utopian scenarios
going as far as speculating that the CoR would eventually
be transformed into a new legislative chamber, alongside
the European Parliament (EP)  and the Council.
The actual development of the CoR has been more
modest, and some of the great expectations have not been
met. Ten years on, the CoR is essentially still the same
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institution that was established by the Maastricht Treaty.
However, it has established itself as a fixture in the institutional
setting of the European Union, and as such has made its
mark on the political life of the continent.
The Committee’s 10th  anniversary provides an oppor-
tunity to assess its performance so far, evaluate its current
status and consider its future challenges and opportunities.
This paper starts this overview by briefly looking at the way
in which the CoR has organised itself internally, and in
particular how it has managed to deal with the diversity of
different interests that it has to bring together. A second
section looks at the relations between the CoR and the other
European institutions and actors, while also discussing its
relationship with civil society in the EU. The subsequent
section contains a brief assessment of the effectiveness of
the Committee’s work, both in terms of the opinions given
on EU policies and in terms of its place in the constitutional
politics of the Union. Finally, we look at the more long-term
effect of the CoR’s presence in the institutional architecture
of the Union, beyond the impact of individual opinions and
decisions. By way of conclusion, the implications for the
Committee of the dual processes of constitutionalisation
and of enlargement are discussed, providing the framework
of opportunities and constraints in the coming years.
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Throughout the paper the emphasis will be on raising
issues and critical questions about the CoR at this particular
juncture, seeking to develop an understanding of what has
been accomplished, where more could be achieved, and
what challenges remain to enhancing the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the CoR within the politics of the European
Union.
2. The Internal Politics of the Committee
The CoR represents a diversity of interests, and brings
together a multitude of different actors from regional, local
and intermediate levels of government. Both in terms of
their origin and actual participation in the work of the
Committee, there are different categories of members. The
most obvious distinction is that between regional and local
representatives. But even among the regional actors there
are significant differences, such as between representatives
of the more administrative regions and those that can be
considered legislative. The latter distinction already indicates
that competence rather than size is a key issue in uniting or
dividing the members of the CoR around a particular issue.
This is in fact one of the central and persistent dilemmas of
the CoR: a diverse membership whose responses to pro-
posals from the European Commission depend on the
varying degrees to which these are felt to have an impact.
To the degree to which the competences of regional and
local authorities depend on the constitutional arrangements
within each Member State, this diversity creates a set of
national divisions, with groups of regions echoing the
national interests of Member States. However, regions and
localities have sought to overcome national lines of conflict
in order to create transnational alliances, bringing together
entities with similar interests from across the European
Union. But even such transnational groupings still constitute
sub-divisions within the CoR, preventing it from developing
the kind of consensualism
that was initially expected
from it, given the discourse
of a ‘Europe of the Regions’
that preceded its creation.
In addition to size and
national- or competence-
based differences, the CoR
membership also divides
along party political lines,
and this is in fact a division
that is becoming increas-
ingly significant. Reflecting
the growing politicisation
of EU affairs more gene-
rally, the political groups in
the CoR have become more
significant in terms of the
internal organisation of
work, allocation of resour-
ces and preparation of
opinions, something that is
also reflected in the recent
decision to change the seating arrangements in the plenary
session. At least procedurally the party political division of
the CoR has turned out to be more significant than the many
other divisions that cut across its membership. We will
return to the issues arising from this in the following section.
Finally, one can also discuss the relationship between
elected members and the Secretariat-General of the CoR.
Part of the benefit of institutionalisation has of course been
the creation of a permanent staff of the CoR, financed out
of the EU budget and serving the interests of its members.
The Secretariat-General of the Committee is a valuable
resource, not only in terms of the logistics of Commission
and plenary meetings, but also in terms of the research
support and the drafting of opinions. Just as with the
Secretariats of the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers, much of the responsibility for continuity and
effective representation rests on the shoulders of the officials
working for the Secretariat-General.
     However, given the frequent controversies that have
surrounded the appointment of senior staff in the Secretariat,
this has also been an area that has caused difficulties for the
CoR. In terms of overall administrative support, there are
clear limits to what is on offer for the Committee – a
situation that in turn raises questions about the decision
taken early on to disengage the administration of the CoR
from that of the Economic and Social Committee (something
which raises questions about the wisdom of the CoR’s
decision to embark on an expansive strategy given the
subjects it covers).
3. The Committee’s Relationship with other
European Institutions, the Member States
and Civil Society
The European Commission has been a long-standing ally
of regions and localities having a role in the EU policy
process, and this strong link between the regional level and
the Commission was strengthened with the creation of the
CoR. From the beginning, the Commission was present in
CoR plenary sessions. Based on a cooperation protocol
between the CoR and the Commission, the Committee has
emphasised its desire to further promote dialogue between
its own high-level repre-
sentatives and those of the
Commission, and to acti-
vely involve and invite Com-
mission members to CoR
meetings.
The Commission’s
interest in regional and lo-
cal representatives arises
from its desire to achieve
better application of its
policies, to gain first-hand
information and to spread
its ideas.  In its White Paper
on European Governance,
the Commission encoura-
ges the CoR to “play a more
proactive role in examining
policy, for example through
the preparation of explo-
ratory reports in advance
of Commission proposals.”
Thus the CoR not only
appeals to the Commission with its opinions and other
statements, but is also actively encouraged by the
Commission to come up with proposals, reports and policy
advice. Despite this information exchange between the
Commission and the CoR, formal channels of communi-
cation and cooperation could still be improved. Such an
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improvement would not
only make the CoR less
dependent on the goodwill
of the Commission, but
also – and perhaps mainly
– improve transparency
and make its work more
open and accessible to the
public. To provide a more
fruitful input, the Com-
mission and the CoR itself
continue to stress the need
for a better, more formal
and more effective invol-
vement of the Committee
in preliminary consul-
tations, the pre-proposal
phase and in the design of
long-term policy strategies
which have an impact at
the local or regional level.
The relationship be-
tween the CoR and Par-
liament has always been a
rather ambiguous one:
being potential allies and
rivals at the same time. It is
only in the last few years
that better interaction between CoR Commissions and their
respective EP Committees has taken place. In March 2002,
for the first time since this  possibility was opened up by the
Treaty of Amsterdam, Parliament made use of its right to
consult the CoR. A further strengthening of cooperation can
be expected due to the new seating order reflecting the
party political affiliation of CoR members. On the one
hand, this change may facilitate better lobbying with
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) through the
political party groups, but on the other hand such a seating
order also carries the risk of CoR opinions being taken less
seriously by the Commission and Council who may come
to regard the CoR as  a pale imitation of the EP.
The CoR’s relationship with the Council is clearly the
weakest one. As an advisory body the CoR already gives its
opinion on Commission proposals and there seems to be
little purpose in the Council consulting the CoR again
subsequently. Neither does the Council issue official reports
on whether or not it has taken CoR opinions into account.
And even according to the Constitutional Treaty, the presence
of regions with legislative capacities in the Council will
continue to depend on individual Member States and their
internal structure.
Recently the CoR has made greater efforts to involve
other institutions and relevant associations in its seminars
and events – in particular the leading European local and
regional associations... In response to the Commission’s
Working Paper on “ongoing and systematic dialogue with
local-government associations”, the regions themselves
generally thought that the CoR should (only) have a
complementary and auxiliary function to such associations,
rather than the principal role that had been proposed by the
Commission. In this sensitive field of inter-regional coope-
ration, a greater systematisation of the permanent dialogues
between the Commission and the single associations could
lead to the rather paradoxical outcome of competition
between the regions and the CoR, with the latter claiming
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that it is the only body to officially represent regional
interests at the European level. In addition, while the
conclusion of tripartite contracts with single regions to
better ensure implementation of legislation and programmes
with strong territorial impact is generally welcomed by the
CoR, it also strongly advocates its own involvement. A
vertical decentralisation, probably supplemented by hori-
zontal interregional cooperation and partnerships with
other local authorities and civil society, would allow for a
more flexible and efficient approach to protect regional
interests – but it might come at the expense of the central
position that the CoR currently holds. In such a scenario, the
CoR could end up serving as a platform for a variety of
different actors, rather than being seen as an actor in its
own right.
In the context of EU enlargement, the CoR has taken an
important initiative by serving as a forum for discussions
and cooperation between the regional and local authorities
of the EU and the regional and local authorities of the new
Member States and the Candidate Countries. To give one
example, at the moment the CoR cooperates with national
regions of Bulgaria, via the specially set up Joint Consultative
Committee, discussing regional issues in the context of EU
accession.
Generally, the CoR also sees itself as a channel for the
flow of information to the wider public and seeks to
maintain direct contact with citizens and civil society.
However, the CoR itself remains a Brussels-based body and
– along with the other European institutions – suffers from
the problems associated with being distant from the Union’s
citizens. A broader, more structured and more systematic
engagement of the CoR with individual regional and local
authorities as well as with civil society organisations and the
CoR itself might enhance participation of the wider public
– something that could help to strengthen the legitimacy of
the CoR in the policy process.
EC-CE
© CoR, 2000-2004
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4. The Effectiveness of the Committee’s Work
The CoR has to be consulted on all areas likely to have
repercussions at local or regional level. That initially meant
that its responsibilities were limited to five areas: economic
and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks,
health, education and culture. The CoR itself may adopt an
own-initiative opinion on any matter it considers appropriate
and the three main institutions can consult it on any matter
for which they deem its opinion and expertise to be of
interest. Considering that according to estimates between
70 and 80 per cent of EU policies require implementation
by regional and local authorities, the Union’s interest in
consulting the CoR to ensure coherent and better
implementation should be obvious.
To assess the impact of CoR opinions systematically
would require looking into each single case in which the
CoR was consulted and then checking retrospectively the
original proposal against the amendments contained in the
legislative act. And
even then one cannot
be certain whether an
amendment was due
to the CoR’s opinion,
or whether the Com-
mission, Council or EP
changed the original
wording due to re-
quests from elsewhere.
For the time being, the
Commission adopts a
report twice a year
giving substantive re-
plies, setting out the
reasons why it intends
to follow the CoR’s re-
commendations or
why it does not feel
itself in a position to
follow them. The Com-
mission report covers all opinions delivered by the CoR,
whether these were mandatory, voluntary or the CoR’s own
initiative.
Even if few of the opinions actually lead to substantive
changes, the ones which the Commission takes most
account of are – unsurprisingly – in the CoR’s main field of
expertise: regional policy and the Structural Funds. Impact
is also attributed to opinions on economy and employment.
Generally it seems that the Commission does follow the
CoR in areas where one can expect the CoR to actually
possess additional and substantive expertise – as is the case
with the Structural Funds, small and medium-sized
undertakings, and transport affecting local and regional
authorities. In other areas where the Commission has
started programmes with regional impact, for example
with the involvement of local and regional authorities in
setting up Territorial Employment Pacts, the Commission
also attaches importance to the CoR’s opinion.
One can only speculate about the degree to which the
quality of the CoR’s opinions influences the Commission’s
follow-up. But it can be assumed that the CoR Commissions
do draw up better and more substantive reports in their
core areas, while having difficulty providing special
knowledge in the more technical fields of agriculture and
the environment and the general area of culture. These are
also the fields where the CoR’s opinions do not very often
result in amendments. In part, one may attribute these
weaknesses to the limited access CoR members have to
administrative and scientific support, which was discussed
in the previous section. However, it may also reflect the
preferences of CoR members, who might pay greater
attention to the issues affecting the regions and localities
they represent.
In terms of possible judicial review of the institutional
reaction to CoR opinions, the fact remains that – despite
repeated requests to change this situation – the Committee
does not (yet) possess a privileged standing before the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Such a right to access the
ECJ would allow the CoR to protect its prerogatives. If and
when the Constitutional Treaty comes into force, however,
consultation of the CoR, in areas where the Treaty provides
for it, will become a directly enforceable formal and legal
requirement. The CoR would have the right to bring in an
action of annulment against a legislative act which had
been adopted without
it being consulted.
These prospective
changes do not at all
make the CoR’s opi-
nions binding. But
what might happen in
the future is that the
CoR could indicate in
its opinions whether it
considers the principle
of subsidiarity to have
been taken into ac-
count or not: Even
though the CoR has
formally not been in-
volved in the so-called
‘early warning proce-
dure’ to protect the
application of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, it
might use its right to issue an opinion as a de facto ‘early
warning’. The Committee could do that by threatening in
the text of the opinion to bring an action of annulment
should the act be adopted without amendment and taking
subsidiarity into account. In this way the CoR’s future ex-
post control powers could boost the ‘legal weight’ of its
opinions in areas where consultation is obligatory. (This
state of affairs is comparable to the EP’s right of scrutiny
regarding the adoption of draft implementing measures in
comitology procedures: EP resolutions are not at all binding,
but are regarded as important because they may contain
an announcement to make use of its right to claim judicial
review).
   These gains, however, fell some way short of the more
far-reaching demands advanced in the course of the last
round of Treaty reform. In particular, the CoR was not given
an active involvement in the legislative procedure itself, as
had been demanded by the RegLeg group. While such an
involvement of a second direct representative body might
enhance the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making
process one could also expect that the full participation of
the CoR as a sort of ‘second chamber’ would also lead to
a more complicated and cumbersome decision-making
process, and thus imply significant efficiency costs for the
EU. It would also be contrary to the very aims of the
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Brussels,17 November 2004 – 10th Anniversary of the Committee of Regions.
© CoR, 2000-2004E
I
P
A
S
C
O
P
E
 
 
B
u
l
l
e
t
i
n
 
2
0
0
5
/
1
EIPASCOPE 2005/1
11
Constitutional Convention and the subsequent Inter-
governmental Conference (IGC) to clarify, simplify and
rationalise the policy process and the institutional
arrangements.
Thus, discussion shows that the CoR not only seeks to
influence the normal policy process through its opinions,
but that it has also had ambitions to effect the Treaty reform
process, in order to change the legal foundations of its
work. The CoR does normally issue opinions in the run-up
to Intergovernmental Conferences, but here the impact is
even more doubtful (and difficult to measure) than in the
legislative procedure. Insofar as region-friendly changes
are introduced in the course of Treaty revisions, this has
generally been attributed to the domestic power of regions
from certain Member States, where their support is required
for ratification.
The most recent instance of Treaty change was novel in
the sense that the Convention method invited other actors
beyond national governments, and civil society more
generally, to participate in the debate about the ‘future of
Europe’. The CoR, which also had representatives at the
Convention, did respond to the invitation to participate in
this debate. Here, as elsewhere, it was crucial for the
Committee to rely on alliances with other actors, be they
regional and local govern-
ment associations, the
European Parliament or,
through the Contact Group,
leading members of the
Convention.
The ultimate outcome
of these efforts by the CoR
to play a role in the consti-
tutional politics of the Union
is difficult to assess, not
only for the reasons de-
scribed above. There is also
disagreement among CoR
members about the best
way of interpreting the
result: for some the achieve-
ment of the long-standing aspiration of a right of access to
the ECJ is a successful outcome of CoR lobbying on this
issue, and this also seems to be the official line from the
CoR. For others, though, the failure to be recognised as an
EU institution and to achieve an active legislative role is a
sign of the continuing weakness of the CoR. The group of
regions with legislative powers (the so-called RegLeg Group)
is in this camp, and they have been explicit in their
frustration with the limitations of the CoR. Thus, the constitu-
tionalisation process also demonstrates the internal divisions
among its members, and divergent expectations of what
the CoR should do and develop into are apparent.
5. The Committee after 10 Years:
Long-term trends and developments
Beyond the issue of an immediate and direct impact of the
CoR on the legislative process and on Treaty revision, the
CoR can claim to have contributed to the integration
process more generally.  It can be argued that it does make
a valuable contribution in a number of ways. First,
independent of what subsequently happens to the opinions
it issues, the CoR provides an open and public forum for
deliberation among a variety of actors. Such regular
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debate and deliberations can have long-term benefits in
terms of the search for better understanding among these
different actors, the development of common perspectives
on policy issues and the search for solutions to problems,
whether these are already on the agenda or not. To be sure,
the CoR is not the only such forum in the EU, but there are
also not that many fora in which elected politicians from the
domestic domain are forced to confront the different
cultures, traditions and perspectives of other Member
States. The long-term effect to be expected from this regular
interaction is a shared perspective on EU matters, which
might help to find solutions to policy problems in the future,
even if there is disagreement in the present.
A second effect, related to these observations, is the
potential for the CoR to act as a generator or catalyst for
horizontal networking among regional and local actors.
The Committee does bring together representatives from
different national domains who – without the presence of
the CoR – might not have the chance, or even see the need,
to discuss EU policies with one another. While the CoR was
founded on the back of an existing advisory committee to
the Commission, and thanks in a large part to the foun-
dations laid by transnational associations such as the
Assembly of European Regions (AER) and the Council of
European Municipalities
and Regions (CEMR), it has
also since its establishment
facilitated further net-
working among the various
actors: either directly
through meetings in the
chamber or more generally
through the focus it has
provided for discussions
among regional and local
representatives about the
institutional arrangements
in the EU. In the same vein,
the idea of horizontal
networking also implies that
the CoR has been a meeting
place for regions to share ideas, experiences and problems,
and to engage in a long-term process of policy-learning.
A third long-term effect of the CoR can be seen in the
symbolic strengthening of the regional idea. To a large
extent, the establishment of the Committee was a symbolic
act, placing regions and localities on the map of an
institutionalised Europe, even if its powers did not at all
match the discourse  about a ‘Europe of the Regions’ which
was so powerful in the early to mid-1990s. This symbolic
empowerment of regions and sub-national government
was no small thing: it did indicate a departure in the
thinking about Europe from a monolithic institutional
structure in Brussels, towards a more decentralised, multi-
level governance system.
The symbolic strengthening of regions at the European
level in turn has had an impact on the domestic standing of
regions. In most Member States, the existence of the CoR
has legitimated the European aspirations of regions and
localities, and has further accelerated the trend towards
establishing dedicated representative offices in Brussels.
But also within domestic systems, which witness continuous
struggles about the allocation of powers across different
levels, the CoR has, on the whole, strengthened the case of
those who have wanted to see more powers given to the
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The constitutionalisation
process also demonstrates
the internal divisions among
its members, and divergent
expectations of what the
CoR should do and develop
into are apparent.
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regional level.
However, the issue of the impact of CoR on domestic
structures is a tricky one, given the diverse nature of CoR
members and of domestic constitutional arrangements in
the Member States. At least as far as the RegLeg group
members are concerned, there is some concern about the
impact of the CoR domestically – clearly there is a limit to
how useful an association with local government
representatives can be for the authority of Prime Ministers
of the bigger German Länder. At worst, there could be the
concern that such ‘company’ might compromise the
domestic role of  the stronger regions, use up valuable time,
expertise and other resources to the detriment of domestic
bargaining, and thus ultimately weaken rather than
strengthen their standing within the national system.
In fact, there has been some disappointment with the
work of CoR among the ‘stronger’ regions who are –
perhaps ironically – precisely those political actors that
have fought hardest for its establishment and like to see
themselves as its foun-
ders. The CoR is bound
to represent all forms of
local and regional
authorities, with the
inevitable dilution of the
high ambitions of its
vanguard that comes
with such broad mem-
bership. Thus, if the CoR
is not strengthened
further, there is a danger
that it may lose the
support of its strongest
members, as these will
look for other ways to
represent their parti-
cular interests. The CoR
has also several times
expressed its position
that it does not want to
sub-divide itself into
local, regional, or any other divisions, thereby frustrating
the minority of regions with legislative powers among its
members. In response, there is a growing tendency of these
regions to look for other ways of representing their interests
and influencing the European decision-making process.
6. Future Perspectives and Challenges
Ten years after the creation of the CoR by the Maastricht
Treaty the local and regional level is explicitly recognised in
the Constitutional Treaty. The new Treaty explicitly calls for
the Union to respect regional and local self-government
and obliges the Commission to take the regional dimension
of its legislative proposals into account. Demonstrating the
strengthened status of the CoR, its current President, Peter
Straub, also attended the official signing of the Constitutional
Treaty in Rome on 29 October 2004.
The Constitutional Treaty does not alter the nature of the
European Union fundamentally: it is a revised Treaty rather
than a constitution in the traditional sense of the concept.
In the present context it needs to be recognized that the CoR
failed in its attempt to be elevated to the formal status of an
EU institution and thus remains merely a body with
consultative status alongside the ESC. Nor does the
involvement of the sub-national level in the subsidiarity test
(i.e. in assessing whether a certain policy area should be the
subject of legislation at the European or at the national
level), make the regional level in itself an actor in the
allocation of legislative powers. By contrast, the CoR is not
to be involved in the early warning system which national
parliaments can use to ensure the application of the
subsidiarity principle during the drafting stage of a
Commission proposal (ex ante political scrutiny).
The significant gain for the CoR under the Constitutional
Treaty would be its role in monitoring the application of the
principle of subsidiarity. This principle is in the Treaty and,
for the first time, defined to take into account the regional
level. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the principle of
subsidiarity is respected and its own prerogatives are being
protected, the CoR will be given the explicit right to take
action against the relevant Community bodies.
Recent proposals from the Commission on the
consultation of regional and local authority associations
place the CoR in the
position of interme-
diary between these
associations and EU
institutions. The key
development with
regard to regional
associations is the
organisation of con-
stitutional regions, or
regions with legisla-
tive powers. It seems
clear that the RegLeg
regions aim more
and more to protect
their interests in the
new Europe outside
the CoR.
Finally, the CoR,
like other bodies in
the EU, will have to
confront the impact
of enlargement, both in terms of what that means for EU
policies, and for its own identity. With respect to the former,
there are likely to be problems given the distributional
conflicts that are looming over the next multi-annual
financial settlement. These may pitch the old against. the
new, and the economically richer regions against the
weaker ones. In other words, the greater and more diverse
membership of the CoR is likely to make it yet more difficult
for members to reach agreement. Enlargement also means
that the CoR itself has to adapt to a greater membership,
with the associated logistical and political problems... The
fact that most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have
rather centralised systems could also further strengthen the
existing majority in the CoR, and might discourage the
stronger regions from seeing the Committee as an instrument
for protecting their interests.
By way of conclusion, we can therefore note that the CoR
has come a very long way since its inception: there has been
a gradual increase in powers, culminating in the provisions
agreed (though not yet ratified) in the Constitutional Treaty,
and a growing membership. But long-standing problems
such as internal divisions and the lack of cohesion when it
comes to passing opinions persist and may even be
mounting. At the same time, the new members should also
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be expected to inject new ideas and fresh momentum into
the Committee’s debates. However, at this point it is still
premature to speculate on the impact of enlargement on
the CoR, given that the participation of representatives from
the new Member States is still quite a recent phenomenon.
This, like many of the other issues raised in this paper, will
remain on the CoR agenda for some time to come, and will
provide material for discussions beyond the 10th anniversary
of the Committee.
NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* Paper presented at the meeting of the CONST Commission of
the Committee of the Regions at Maastricht, 2 December
2004.
** We are grateful for valuable comments received on an earlier
draft from Edward Best, Christian Engel and Gracia Vara
Arribas. The responsibility for the content of the paper lies with
the authors. ::
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